Revisionary Epistemology by Fassio, Davide & McKenna, Robin
  
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry, available online: 
http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/0020174X.2015.1083468. 
Revisionary Epistemology 
Author 1 Davide Fassio, University of Geneva 
davide.fassio@unige.ch 
Author 2 Robin McKenna, University of Vienna 
rbnmckenna@gmail.com 
Abstract What is knowledge? What should knowledge be like? Call an epistemological project 
that sets out to answer the first question ‘descriptive’ and a project that sets out to answer the 
second question ‘normative’. If the answers to these two questions don’t coincide - if what 
knowledge should be like differs from what knowledge is like - there is room for a third project 
we call ‘revisionary’. A revisionary project starts by arguing that what knowledge should be 
differs from what knowledge is. It then proposes that we revise our account of knowledge 
accordingly. Our aim in this paper is to develop a methodology for revisionary projects in 
epistemology. Put roughly, the thought is that we start by looking at the various things that we 
expect knowledge to do for us. Once we have a list of the various things we expect knowledge to 
do for us we have a ‘job description’; a list of tasks we need done, and that we expect knowledge 
to perform. With the job description in hand, we can ask what knowledge would have to be like 
in order to perform these tasks. Along the way we give some reasons for embarking on a 
revisionary project in epistemology, and we outline what the upshot might be.  
0. Introduction 
What is knowledge? What should knowledge be like? Call an epistemological project that sets out 
to answer the first question ‘descriptive’ and a project that sets out to answer the second 
question ‘normative’. If the answers to these two questions don’t coincide - if what knowledge 
should be like differs from what knowledge is like - there is room for a third project we call 
‘revisionary’. A revisionary project starts by arguing that what knowledge should be differs from 
what knowledge is. It then proposes that we revise our account of knowledge accordingly, i.e. in 
accordance with what knowledge should be like.  
We will say more about the relationship between these projects, but from the outset let us make 
two things clear. First, when we talk about what ‘knowledge’ is or should be we are primarily 
talking about the concept knowledge. To say that knowledge is (should be) a certain way is to say 
that the concept is (should be) a certain way. Space for a revisionary project opens up if the 
concept isn’t as it should be. This is not to say one can’t make sense of our three projects at the 
level of properties. In terms of properties, the descriptive project is interested in the referents 
  
picked out by our knowledge concept, whereas the normative project is interested in the 
referents that the concept should be picking out. Again, space for a revisionary project opens up 
if the concept isn’t picking out the referents it should pick out. But, given our interest in 
revisionary projects, we prefer to talk about the knowledge concept, not the property (we usually 
can’t revise properties).1 
Second, we draw the distinction between the three projects in terms of the question they address, 
not in terms of the methodology used to address it. As will become clear, we think that the 
appropriate methodologies for descriptive, normative and revisionary projects overlap, at least to 
some extent. This has the practical consequence that it is sometimes unclear which of our three 
projects are being pursued by particular epistemologists (see §1). 
While descriptive projects are common in contemporary epistemology, revisionary projects have 
been neglected. This neglect isn’t particular to epistemology. In general, philosophers are more 
interested in descriptive projects than normative or revisionary projects (we discuss some 
exceptions in §1).2 While there are many reasons for this, three are worth mentioning. First, 
absent any reason to think that what knowledge should be differs from what knowledge is, there 
is no motivation for revisionary projects. Second, revisionary projects involve an objectionable 
semantic or conceptual revisionism. Put bluntly, philosophers shouldn’t be in the business of 
changing the meanings of our words. Third, it is unclear how one determines what knowledge 
should be like. In contrast, while epistemologists disagree about what knowledge is, most agree 
on the appropriate methodology for tackling the question. It involves a mixture of intuitions 
about hypothetical cases, general intuitions about knowledge (e.g. that it is valuable), and so on. 
Our primary aim in this paper is to explain why these lines of resistance to revisionary projects 
are mistaken. In response to the first reason, we present evidence that our concept knowledge is 
governed by a set of inconsistent principles. On the assumption that knowledge shouldn’t be 
inconsistent, it follows we have motivation to pursue a revisionary project in epistemology. In 
response to the second, we argue that, while philosophers perhaps shouldn’t be in the business 
                                                 
1 We can revise some properties (e.g. socially constructed properties, like the property of being 
rich), but the knowledge property isn’t usually regarded as socially constructed (but see Kusch, 
Knowledge by Agreement). Because we want to set this issue aside, we’ll not talk much about the 
knowledge property. 
2 To anticipate: In §1 we point out that revisionary projects were far more common in the first half 
of the 20th century, and suggest that the reason has to do with the perceived aims of philosophy. 
It is worth noting that there has recently been renewed interest in revisionary projects; see 
Cappelen, ‘Illusions of Thought’; Chalmers, ‘Verbal Disputes’; Haslanger, ‘What Knowledge Is’, 
‘What Good Are Our Intuitions?’. 
  
of stipulating new meanings for our words, there is no reason why philosophers shouldn’t be in 
the business of suggesting improvements. 
In response to the third, we outline how one might pursue a revisionary project in epistemology. 
Put roughly, to figure out what knowledge should be like we need to look at the various things 
we expect knowledge to do for us. For instance, it is frequently said that knowledge has the 
function of identifying good informants. In saying that Sarah knows the train leaves at 3pm I 
identify her as a good informant on the matter of when the train leaves.3 Once we have a list of 
the various things we expect knowledge to do for us we have a ‘job description’; a list of tasks 
that we need done, and that knowledge is supposed to perform.4 With the job description in 
hand, we can ask what knowledge would have to be like in order to perform these tasks. In 
answering that question we figure out what knowledge should be like. 
Our secondary aim is to illustrate how our revisionary methodology works. To do this we will 
take a number of functions that we expect knowledge to serve and show that the upshot is a 
view we call ‘revisionary sensitive invariantism’. The view is ‘revisionary’ because it is an account 
of what knowledge should be, not what knowledge is. The view is ‘sensitive invariantist’ because 
it says that whether a subject S knows some proposition p depends on various practical factors, 
as well as the usual truth-conducive factors.5 While we are inclined to think that revisionary 
sensitive invariantism is the best revisionary view available, our purpose here is mainly 
illustrative. If we can convince you that the methodology is sound we will have achieved our 
goal. 
We proceed as follows. In §1 we situate our paper with respect to its historical and contemporary 
precedents. In §2 we present evidence that our concept knowledge is governed by inconsistent 
principles, and we argue that this evidence motivates a revisionary project in epistemology. In §3 
we outline and illustrate our revisionary methodology. 
1. Some Background 
In this section we briefly survey historical and contemporary revisionary approaches. We close 
the section by offering a tentative diagnosis and endorsement of the driving thought behind 
revisionary approaches, both within and outside epistemology. 
                                                 
3 Craig, Knowledge and the State of Nature, 11-17 
4 We borrow the ‘job description’ metaphor from Fisher, ‘Meanings and Methodologies’, 60-1. 
5 Fantl and McGrath, Knowledge in an Uncertain World; Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries; Stanley, 
Knowledge and Practical Interests. 
  
We can start with the method of explication, which one finds in both Carnap and Quine. Put 
roughly, the idea behind explication is that one takes an ordinary language concept (the 
‘explicandum’) and tries to find another concept (the ‘explicatum’) which fulfils the following 
criteria: 
i. The explicatum is similar to the explicandum in that, in many (not necessarily all) cases in which 
the explicandum applies, the explicatum does too. 
ii. The characterisation of the explicatum is exact. 
iii. The explicatum is fruitful (e.g. for the formulation of universal statements). 
iv. The explicatum is simple.6 
While more could be said about explication, what is important here is that Carnap’s criteria 
capture both the conservative and revisionary aspects of explication. On the one hand, it is a 
requirement that the explicatum be similar to the explicandum, in that their extensions must not 
differ too much. On the other, differences are permitted, and given criteria (ii)-(iv) they are to be 
expected. As Quine put it, in offering an explication of some concept: 
We do not claim synonymy. We do not claim to make clear and explicit what the users of the unclear 
expression had unconsciously in mind all along. We do not expose hidden meanings, as the words 
'analysis' and 'explication' would suggest; we supply lacks. We fix on the particular functions of the 
unclear expression that make it worth troubling about, and then devise a substitute, clear and 
couched in terms to our liking, that fills those functions.7 
In short, the aim in explicating a concept is to improve it. But there is a difference between 
improving a concept and inventing a new one, and both Carnap and Quine saw explication as a 
matter of improvement, not invention. 
Turning to contemporary epistemology, Edward Craig has provided a ‘practical explication’ of 
knowledge, by which he means an account of what knowledge would have to be like in order to 
play a particular functional role (identifying good informants).8 It is no part of Craig’s view that 
his account of what knowledge would have to be is a perfect match for the actual concept, 
although he thinks it is important that the differences be minor. Here’s Craig: 
We take some prima facie plausible hypothesis about what the concept of knowledge does for us, 
what its role in our life might be, and then ask what a concept having that role would be like, what 
                                                 
6 Carnap, Foundations of Probability, 5-8. 
7 Quine, Word and Object, 258-9. 
8 Craig, Knowledge and the State of Nature. 
  
conditions would govern its application. Such an investigation would still have an anchorage point in 
the everyday concept: should it reach a result quite different from the intuitive intension, or one that 
yielded an extension quite different from the intuitive extension, then, barring some special and 
especially plausible explanation of the mismatch, the original hypothesis about the role that the 
concept plays in our life would of course be the first casualty. For it is not the idea to construct an 
imaginary concept, but to illuminate the one we actually have, though it be vague or even 
inconsistent.9 
More recently, Sally Haslanger has provided an account of what knowledge would have to be like 
in order to further certain social and political goals.10 However, Haslanger is more open to 
revision than Craig: 
[T]he specifically epistemic questions "What is knowledge?" or "What is objectivity?" require us to 
consider what work we want these concepts to do for us; why do we need them at all? The 
responsibility is both to investigate our purposes in having them, and then to define them in a way 
that best meets our legitimate purposes. In doing so we will want to be responsive to ordinary usage 
(and to aspects of both the connotation and extension of the terms). However, there is also a 
stipulative element to the project: this is the phenomenon we need to think about; let us use the term 
'knowledge' to refer to it.11 
Craig, Haslanger and Carnap differ with respect to how much emphasis they put on Carnap’s 
first criterion for successful explication (Craig puts a lot of emphasis on it whereas Carnap and 
Haslanger a lot less) and the sorts of roles that are relevant (Craig and Haslanger are interested in 
practical roles whereas Carnap is interested in theoretical roles). But, despite these differences, 
they share the core idea that, when developing an account of a concept such as knowledge, one 
should do so with an eye to the purpose or roles of that concept.   
It is an interesting sociological question why, with exceptions like Craig and Haslanger, explicitly 
revisionary approaches have gone out of favour (we leave it up to the reader to decide how 
common implicitly revisionary approaches are).12 Our (very) tentative diagnosis is that it has 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 2 
10 Haslanger, ‘What Knowledge Is’. 
11 Ibid., 468. 
12 Consider the project of providing an informative ‘analysis’ of the concept knowledge, which is 
often seen as the paradigm of an attempt to fit an account of a concept around a set of intuitions. 
But, nowadays anyway, considerations about the value and functions of knowledge are central to 
the project, and its practitioners are open to revision. For instance, we might have reason to reject 
an account that deals with all the cases on the grounds that it fails to account for the value or 
  
something to do with the perceived aims of philosophy. When you read Carnap it is clear that he 
thinks of philosophical analysis as a tool. We can use the methods, argumentative devices and 
vocabulary of philosophy to develop sophisticated accounts of concepts, such as that of 
probability, which can then be put to work in other disciplines (in this case, science). As Herman 
Cappelen has put it: 
These authors’ [Carnap, Quine, and others] interest in describing how language worked served, in 
large part, a normative goal: to figure out how to make language better and how to improve it as a 
cognitive tool.13 
The underlying idea is that the ultimate aims of philosophy are ameliorative, not descriptive. One 
can’t entirely separate the ameliorative aim from the descriptive. It is hard to improve something, 
such as language, without first finding out how it works. But, for someone like Carnap, finding 
out how language works is the start of the task, not the goal.  
We suspect that, unlike Carnap and Quine, most philosophers in the last fifty or so years don’t 
think the ultimate aims of philosophy are ameliorative.14 While we lack the space to argue the 
point here, we think that Carnap and Quine had the right view about the ultimate aims of 
philosophy. Much (though not all) philosophy is concerned with how we think about the world 
around us, and with ‘analysing’ concepts - figuring out their intensions, extensions, and so on. 
But concepts are tools for making sense of the world, and expressing truths about what is going 
on it. If it turns out that we are better able to talk about the world by changing our concepts - by 
modifying and improving our tools - then we have reason to do so. Applying this to knowledge, 
our concept knowledge is a tool we use to identify a particular sort of cognitive success. But it 
could be that our current concept isn’t ideally suited to identifying the relevant sort of success. 
Unlike Carnap and Quine we don’t focus on the role that knowledge might play in a formal 
system (but see §3.3). Rather, like Craig and Haslanger, we will look at the practical roles that we 
expect knowledge to play, and develop an account of what knowledge would have to be like in 
order to play those roles. The end result is an improvement on our current concept. 
                                                 
functions of knowledge (see Jones, ‘Do We Value Knowledge?’; Pritchard, ‘On Meta-
Epistemology’;  Riggs, ‘The Value Turn’).   
13 Cappelen, ‘Nonsense and Illusions of Thought’, 23. 
14 Cappelen provides an impressive list including philosophers of language like Davidson, Kripke 
and Putnam and linguists like Heim and Kratzer (ibid.). 
  
2. Knowledge and Inconsistency 
The argument of this section is as follows: 
1. If knowledge isn’t as it should be, we have reason to embark on a revisionary project. 
2. Knowledge isn’t as it should be. 
3. We have reason to embark on a revisionary project. 
We take the first premise to require little by way of defence. As we put it earlier, if knowledge 
isn’t as it should be, space opens up for a revisionary project. 
Our defence of the second premise will start with evidence that our concept knowledge is 
governed by a set of inconsistent principles (§2.1).  There are a number of things one could say 
about this evidence, but two are particularly important. First, one might say that, while all of 
these principles seem to govern knowledge, they don’t all actually do so. Second, one might say 
that our concept knowledge is actually inconsistent. In §2.2 we argue against the first response, 
and in favour of the second.15 While we take our argument to only make a prima facie case that 
knowledge is inconsistent, the prima facie case should be more than enough to establish the 
second premise. That the case can be made at all is excellent evidence that the concept 
knowledge is ‘messy’, in the sense that our best thinking about it is pulled in conflicting 
directions. Paraphrasing Craig, in a revisionary project we revise a concept we actually have 
because it is messy, or even incoherent. 
The argument requires the further premise that, if knowledge is inconsistent, it isn’t as it should 
be. It is very plausible that, in general, our concepts shouldn’t be inconsistent and that, for any 
concept, if it turns out that that concept is inconsistent, we should do something about it, viz. 
change it in such a way that it is no longer inconsistent. But Matt Weiner has argued that, while 
knowledge is inconsistent, the inconsistency is (mostly) harmless.16 While we lack the space to go 
into any detail, we doubt that the inconsistency is harmless. Weiner’s basic thought is that the 
principles governing knowledge only give inconsistent verdicts in marginal cases.17 But, as will 
become clear below, this isn’t so. This is partly because we focus on a wider range of principles 
than Weiner, and so uncover a lot more inconsistency. But it is also because the principles give 
conflicting verdicts in very mundane cases. For instance, some of our principles tell us that I can 
                                                 
15 For other arguments to this effect see Schiffer, ‘Contextualist Solutions’; Weiner, ‘Inconsistency 
of Knowledge Ascriptions’. While our argument owes much to Weiner, there is an important 
difference; see immediately below. 
16 Weiner, ‘Inconsistency of Knowledge Ascriptions’. 
17 Ibid., 14-18. 
  
know a train time just from being told by a reliable passerby, whereas other principles tell us that 
I can’t. If the principles give conflicting verdicts even in mundane cases, we can expect this to 
cause problems. 
2.1. The Evidence 
We will introduce the principles in three groups. First, we have (Parity of Evidence Principle) 
and (Knowledge-Action Principle): 
(Parity of Evidence Principle) If two subjects S and S* have the same evidence for some proposition 
p, S is in a position to know p iff S* is in a position to know p.18 
(Knowledge-Action Principle) It is rational for S to treat p as a reason for action iff S knows p. 
(Parity of Evidence Principle) fits with the epistemological orthodoxy that whether a true belief 
counts as knowledge just depends on whether the evidence supporting it is sufficiently strong. 
According to this orthodoxy, differences in practical factors - e.g. what’s at stake - are irrelevant. 
The principle is also supported by two intuitions. First, sentences like (1) seem absurd (where it 
is specified that S hasn’t gained or lost any evidence): 
(1) S knows p now, but he didn’t yesterday, when it mattered more. 19 
Second, knowledge is stable: it does not come and go with variations in interests, or other factors 
unrelated to truth.20 
(Knowledge-Action Principle) is supported by ordinary evaluations of the rationality of actions.21 
For instance, a doctor is criticisable for using a needle he does not know is safe, and Sally is 
criticisable for not paying her health insurance as she does not know she won’t fall ill. Similarly, 
if I turn left on the way to the airport I can justify myself by saying I know the airport is in that 
direction.  
However, (Parity of Evidence Principle) and (Knowledge-Action Principle) seem to be 
inconsistent. Whether it is rational to treat a proposition as a reason for acting is sensitive to 
practical factors. Jane has to catch a train, but she doesn’t know which platform it leaves from. 
Suppose Jane is in a low stakes situation and she asks a reliable looking passerby which platform 
                                                 
18 We’re using ‘evidence’ in a very broad sense here that is intended to cover all and only those 
facts that are conducive to p being true. 
19 DeRose, ‘Now You Know It’; Yourgrau, ‘Knowledge and Relevant Alternatives’. 
20 This point goes back to Plato, but see Williamson, Knowledge and its Limits, 78-80. 
21 Hawthorne and Stanley, ‘Knowledge and Action’. 
  
it is. Trusting her advice, she boards the relevant train. Intuitively, in doing so she is rational. 
Now suppose Jane is in a high stakes situation (if she misses her meeting she loses her job) and 
she asks the same passerby. In this case she would be irrational in boarding the train without 
seeking corroboration (e.g. asking an official). Because Jane would be rational in the first case but 
not in the second, it follows from (Knowledge-Action Principle) that she knows in the first case 
but not the second. However, because her evidence is exactly the same in both cases, it follows 
from (Parity of Evidence Principle) that she knows in the first case iff she knows in the second. 
So the two principles are inconsistent. 
Second, we have (Testimony Principle) and (Social Principle): 
(Testimony Principle) If S knows p, then S* would be in a position to know that p if S were to tell her 
so (assuming S is generally trustworthy and nothing else interferes with the transmission of 
knowledge). 
(Social Principle) Whether it is right to ascribe knowledge to a subject S can vary with the social 
context. 
Many of our beliefs about the world around us come from testimony. So, if we want to avoid 
scepticism, something like (Testimony Principle) must be true. However, (Testimony Principle) 
is also incompatible with (Knowledge-Action Principle). According to (Testimony Principle), 
Jane is in a position to know based on the passerby’s testimony in both the low and high stakes 
cases whereas, according to (Knowledge-Action Principle), she isn’t.  
(Social Principle) is supported by a variant of the Jane case. Say the passerby, Tom, knows which 
platform the train leaves from on the basis of further testimony from an official. If Tom has no 
reason to think a lot rides on Jane getting the right train, it is right for him to tell her that he 
knows which train it is. In contrast, if Tom has some reason to think a lot rides on Jane getting 
the right train, it is wrong for him to tell her that he knows which train it is.  
However, (Social Principle) seems to conflict with (Parity of Evidence Principle) and (Testimony 
Principle). According to (Parity of Evidence Principle), whether a subject knows is just a matter 
of the evidence she possesses, and has nothing to do with the social context. According to 
(Testimony Principle), if the official who tells Tom which train the platform leaves from knows, 
  
then Tom does too. But, in the case where Tom thinks the stakes are high for Jane, he can’t 
appropriately say that he knows.22 
Finally, we have these four principles: 
(Odds Principle) Even if p is massively against the odds still, no matter how unlikely it is that p, one 
can’t know not-p just based on knowing the odds. 
(Fallibilist Knowledge Principle) Some knowledge is based on less than conclusive evidence.  
(Strength of Evidence Principle) Where p and q are both true, if S’s belief p is justified to degree E, 
S*’s belief q is justified to degree E*, and E is much higher than E*, then if S is not in a position to 
know p, S* is not in a position to know q. 
(Closure Principle) If S knows p, and S knows that p entails q, and S comes to believe q solely on the 
basis of competently deducing it from p while retaining knowledge that p throughout the competent 
deduction, then S knows q. 
To see the motivation for (Odds Principle), consider an example. No matter how unlikely it is 
that my lottery ticket will win, I can’t know it won’t win just based on knowing the odds. 
Suppose Sally discards her lottery ticket before the draw, and justifies herself by saying that the 
ticket will lose. Sally is subject to criticism, and the natural way of voicing the criticism is to say: 
“you didn’t know that your ticket would lose.” 
(Fallibilist Knowledge Principle) is supported by mundane examples of knowledge. If I read in 
the newspaper that Manchester United won 2-1 last night then I don’t have conclusive evidence 
that Manchester United won 2-1 - the newspaper could be unreliable. Still, unless I have reason 
to think the newspaper is unreliable, I know Manchester United won 2-1. Or consider this case, 
from Jonathan Vogel.23 If I parked my car outside then I don’t have conclusive evidence that it is 
still outside - there could be car thieves about. Still, unless I have reason to think there are car 
thieves about, I know my car is outside. 
                                                 
22 We’re assuming it is right for Tom to self-ascribe knowledge iff he knows. One might object 
that this is a matter of the pragmatics, not semantics, of knowledge ascriptions (see Brown, 
‘Contextualism and Warranted Assertibility’; Gerken, ‘Roles of Knowledge’; Rysiew, ‘Context-
Sensitivity of Knowledge’). While we can’t address this issue here note, first, that the pragmatic 
interpretation has its own problems (see Blome-Tillmann, ‘Knowledge and Implicatures’) and, 
second, (Social Principle) isn’t essential to our aims in this section, or the paper in general. 
23 Vogel, ‘Counterexamples to Closure’. 
  
(Strength of Evidence Principle) is supported by the same epistemological orthodoxy as (Parity 
of Evidence Principle). But it is significantly weaker. (Strength of Evidence Principle) just says 
that, where p and q are both true, if subject S has far stronger evidence in favour of p than 
subject S* has in favour of q, then it can’t be that S* is in a position to know q but S isn’t in a 
position to know p. If Ailsa has far stronger evidence that she has hands than Catriona has that 
the train leaves at 3pm, then it can’t be that Catriona is in a position to know the train leaves at 
3pm but Ailsa isn’t in a position to know she has hands. 
Finally, to see the motivation for (Closure Principle) consider the mathematician who proves one 
result, thereby gaining some knowledge, and then proves that her first result entails a second 
result. The mathematician thereby gains further knowledge. 
However, (Odds Principle), (Weak Knowledge Principle) and (Strength of Evidence Principle) 
are inconsistent.24 I get far stronger evidence that my lottery ticket lost from knowing the odds 
than I get that Manchester United won 2-1 from reading the newspaper (it is far more likely that 
the newspaper got the result wrong than it is that I won the lottery).25 By (Strength of Evidence 
Principle), if I don’t know my lottery ticket lost, I don’t know Manchester United won 2-1. But 
by (Odds Principle) I don’t know my lottery ticket lost, yet by (Weak Knowledge Principle) I do 
know Manchester United won 2-1. 
Further, (Odds Principle), (Weak Knowledge Principle) and (Closure Principle) are 
inconsistent.26 Consider this example.27 A friend suggests I go on safari, but I tell her I can’t 
afford to because my financial situation is modest. However, I have a ticket in a lottery with a big 
cash prize. The winning ticket has been drawn but has not been announced. I know that if I 
can’t afford to go on safari then I haven’t won the lottery. (Weak Knowledge Principle) tells us 
that I know that I can’t afford to go on safari. However, (Odds Principle) tells us that I don’t 
know I haven’t won the lottery. So, by contraposing (Closure Principle), it follows that I don’t 
know I can’t afford to go on safari, contradicting (Weak Knowledge Principle). 
                                                 
24 Ibid. 
25 We’re assuming that strength of evidential support is tied to likelihood here. Smith, ‘What Else 
Justification Could Be’, presents an interesting challenge to this way of thinking about evidential 
support, but we lack the space to deal with it. Suffice it to say that the view we assume is the 
standard one. 
26 Vogel, ‘Counterexamples to Closure’; Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries, Chap. 1. 
27 Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries, 1-3. 
  
2.2. The Explanations 
The obvious thing to say about our principles is that, while each principle is prima facie plausible, 
knowledge is actually governed by a consistent subset of the various principles. Making good on 
this idea requires, first, identifying which principles do and which principles don’t govern 
knowledge and, second, giving an error-theoretic explanation why we mistakenly think that 
certain principles govern knowledge. Our aim in the rest of this sub-section is to suggest that this 
response won’t work. Due to limitations of space we can’t discuss the various ways of filling in 
the details. What we’ll do instead is focus on one pair of principles, (Parity of Evidence Principle) 
and (Knowledge-Action Principle), and a particular response, on which the former should be 
accepted and the latter rejected.28 The reasons the particular response won’t work will hopefully 
generalise to other responses.  
The simplest and most effective way to show that (Knowledge-Action Principle) should be 
rejected would be to show that there are cases in which the subject hasn’t got knowledge, yet 
intuitively can act.29 Critics of (Knowledge-Action Principle) have proposed that Gettier cases are 
of this type.30 Smith has the justified true belief that someone in his office will get the job, but he 
doesn’t know this because he’s wrong about the identity of the person (he mistakenly thinks it 
will be Jones). Yet, one might think, Smith is rational in acting on his belief that someone in his 
office will get the job. If that’s right, then (Knowledge-Action Principle) should be rejected.  
Unfortunately, these cases haven’t moved those who accept (Knowledge-Action Principle). A 
common response is that the putative counter-examples ignore the distinction between violating 
a norm and being to blame for violating that norm.31 The thought is that, while Smith violates 
(Knowledge-Action Principle), his violation is blameless (Smith wasn’t aware he was violating the 
principle). However, this move doesn’t advance the debate. It suggests that the force of the 
putative counter-example relies on ignoring the distinction between violating a norm and being 
to blame for violating that norm. But those who have proposed these counter-examples deny 
that the putative counter-example is a case of norm-violation, whether blameless or not.32  
This debate has reached a dialectical stalemate. Critics of (Knowledge-Action Principle) think it 
is obvious that there are cases in which a subject is rational in acting yet lacks knowledge (and 
                                                 
28 For this response see Brown, ‘Subject-Sensitive Invariantism’; Gerken, ‘Warrant and Action’. 
29 Or that there are cases in which the subject has got knowledge, yet intuitively can’t act. While 
we focus on one sort of case, what we say should generalise to this sort of case too. 
30 Brown, ‘Subject-Sensitive Invariantism’, 171-4; Gerken, ‘Warrant and Action’, 535-7. 
31 Hawthorne and Stanley, ‘Knowledge and Action’, 572-4; Littlejohn, ‘Unity of Reason’, 139-40. 
32 Gerken, ‘Warrant and Action’, 537-43, is explicit about this. 
  
cases in which a subject has knowledge yet isn’t rational in acting), whereas proponents of the 
principle think it isn’t. We would suggest that, when a debate about an ordinary language notion 
such as knowledge reaches this sort of stalemate, this is prima facie evidence that the notion is 
inconsistent, and excellent evidence that the ordinary language notion is ‘messy’, in the sense that 
our best thinking about it is pulled in opposing directions. If this is right, then we have good 
reason to embark on a revisionary project. We now turn to how a revisionary project might look. 
3. Revisionary Epistemology 
How, exactly, do we go about revising knowledge? The ‘revisionist’ proposes devising a new 
concept, knowledge*, to replace our current concept, knowledge.33 But what constraints are there 
on our choice of knowledge*?34 There are a potentially infinite number of ways in which we 
could revise our concept, and the revisionist needs to tell us how to choose between them. In 
§3.1 we introduce the methodology we employ in choosing between different revisionary 
accounts. In §3.2 we illustrate our methodology by developing a revisionary account of 
knowledge* we call revisionary sensitive invariantism. We finish in §3.3 by briefly mentioning a 
further benefit of revisionary sensitive invariantism. 
3.1. Our Revisionist Methodology 
We can start by distinguishing between ‘free’ and ‘constrained’ revision. As examples of free 
revision, consider stipulating meanings and using words in a ‘technical sense’. While free revision 
is perfectly fine in some contexts, we doubt there is much to be gained by developing a freely 
revisionary account of knowledge*. In general, when the target of one’s analysis is a concept X, 
one may introduce stipulated meanings for terms that feature in the analysis of X, but not for X. 
Since the target of our analysis is the concept knowledge, we can’t just stipulate a meaning for 
knowledge*. This leaves us with constrained revision, which preserves certain features of the 
                                                 
33 We use the locution ‘revise the concept’ to communicate the intuitive idea that we can revise 
and improve our concepts. How this intuitive idea gets cashed out depends on your view of 
concepts. If concepts are unchanging entities then the revisionist is proposing taking a word 
(“knowledge”) and using it to express a different but related concept. If you prefer to think of 
concepts as closer to cognitive tools - tools for dividing up the world - then the revisionist is 
proposing dividing up the world slightly differently. Other options are available, and we suspect 
you’ll be able to translate what we say into the terms of your chosen view. 
34 In what follows we often talk of revisionary accounts “preserving” various principles. Because 
the relevant principles are phrased in terms of knowledge rather than knowledge*, this is just 
convenient shorthand. Similarly, in places we talk about “knowledge”, leaving it open whether we 
mean the original or revised concept. In both cases the rationale is that the original and revised 
concepts share certain important features (more on this below). 
  
relevant concept. But which features are we going to preserve? The two key notions are going to 
be principles and functions, which we’ll explain in turn.  
Principles are general truths that plausibly govern the relevant concept (here, knowledge). While 
we discussed some of the principles governing knowledge in §2, our list was incomplete. For 
example, we left out the principle that, if S knows p, then p is true (Factivity) and the principle 
that, if S knows p, then S believes p (Belief). We want to highlight that it is no part of our 
account that any of these principles are more fundamental, and in particular it is no part of our 
account that the principles are the sorts of things one has to grasp in order to be a competent 
user of the knowledge concept. 
Turning to functions, as a rough first pass the functions of a concept X are the things that we 
expect X to do or bring about. In the literature one finds these functions for knowledge: 
i. to identify good or reliable informants.35 Example: In saying that Catriona knows the bus leaves 
at 3pm I identify her as a good informant about when the bus leaves. 
ii. to indicate when an inquirer can reasonably terminate inquiry.36 Example: In saying that I know 
the bus leaves at 3pm I signal that I can reasonably terminate my inquiry into when the bus 
leaves. 
iii. to provide grounds for action and sincere assertion; to provide premises for sound reasoning and 
deliberation.37 
Why think that (i)-(iii) are functions of knowledge? One argument goes via linguistic 
considerations. For instance, there is often something wrong about making these claims: 
(1) Catriona knows the bus leaves at 3pm, but she isn’t a good informant as to when the bus leaves. 
(2) I know the bus leaves at 3pm, but I need to inquire further into when the bus leaves. 
(3) I know the bus leaves at 3pm, but I’m not going to use this as a basis for action. 
Of course, there are certain contexts in which these claims are acceptable. This is perhaps most 
obvious with (1). Imagine that, while Catriona is well-informed about when the bus leaves, she 
refuses to tell anyone. One way to describe Catriona would be by uttering (1). So a nice 
                                                 
35 See Craig, Knowledge and the State of Nature, Chap. 2. 
36 See Kappel, ‘Saying That Someone Knows’’’ Kelp, ‘What’s the Point’; Rysiew, ‘Epistemic 
Scorekeeping’. 
37 See Bird, ‘Justified Judging’; Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries, Chap. 2, Chap. 4. 
  
explanation of why (1)-(3) often seem wrong is that we often expect knowledge to be used to do 
certain things, as in (i)-(iii).  
Another argument for (i)-(iii) notes that we need a concept that answers to various 
requirements.38 First, we require a way of identifying those around us who have information 
about the world, given that we can’t obtain all the information we need ourselves. Second, 
inquiry is, in principle, open-ended. No matter how much I have inquired into some matter, I 
can still gather more evidence. So we require a way of identifying when to terminate inquiry. 
Third, we require a way of identifying which beliefs we can (and which beliefs we can’t) use in 
reasoning about how to act. There are rather stringent conditions a concept would have to meet 
to be a candidate for meeting these requirements. It would have to be an epistemic concept and, 
given the everyday nature of the requirements, it would also have to be an ordinary language 
term. This rules out familiar items of epistemic vocabulary such as ‘justification’, and leaves 
‘knowledge’ as the obvious candidate. 
These arguments notwithstanding, we don’t want to commit to these being the functions of 
knowledge. It could be that there are others, and it could even be that we don’t often expect 
knowledge to do these things (though we doubt this is the case). But we’ll need to have concrete 
proposals for the functions of knowledge for the purposes of outlining our methodology, and 
(i)-(iii) are the best available candidates. So, with this proviso, we’ll assume them in what follows. 
Principles and functions differ in two crucial respects. First, the principles governing a concept X 
are things that are meant to be true of all instances of X, whereas the functions of a concept X 
are things we expect many (maybe all) uses of X to do or bring about. So a crucial difference 
between (Knowledge-Action Principle) and the third function claim is that the latter, but not the 
former, permits exceptions.39 Second, the principles governing a concept may but need not 
specify its functional role. (Parity of Evidence Principle) says that two subjects alike evidentially 
with respect to some proposition p are either both in a position to know p or both not in a 
position to know p. This says nothing about the functional role of knowledge or knowledge 
ascriptions. 
                                                 
38 See Craig, Knowledge and the State of Nature, Chap. 1, Chap. 2; Kelp, ‘What’s the Point’. 
39 Another is that (Knowledge-Action Principle) is a normative claim, whereas the third function 
claim is about the expected use of a concept. 
  
We can now outline the constraints on our revisionary methodology. The first and most 
important constraint is what we call the ‘Function Constraint’: 
i. ‘Function Constraint’: The best revisionary account of knowledge* is the account that is best 
suited to fulfilling the functions of knowledge. 
As we’ll sometimes put it, the aim is to ‘build’ our account of knowledge* around the relevant 
functions. Of course, it might be that there are a number of accounts of knowledge* that meet 
this constraint. In order to choose between them we can apply the second constraint, which we 
call the ‘Presumption of Innocence Constraint’: 
ii. ‘Presumption of Innocence Constraint’: If we are given no reason to reject a principle 
governing knowledge - such as that it is inconsistent with another principle, or prevents 
knowledge from performing a function - we should include it in our account of knowledge*. 
The motivation for this constraint is a moderate methodological conservatism. If we have two 
accounts that serve the functions of knowledge equally well, we should prefer the account that is 
least revisionary. While this is a sort of conservatism, it only applies in a very special case, viz. 
when two accounts serve the functions equally well. 
Putting these constraints together, the aim is to develop an account of knowledge* that is best 
suited to fulfilling the various functions that knowledge serves. If this doesn’t uniquely determine 
an account of knowledge*, we should choose the account that is least revisionary. The result of 
this process will be an account of knowledge* that preserves a central feature of knowledge, 
namely the functions that it serves. The main difference between knowledge and knowledge* will 
be that the latter is custom-built to serve these functions.40 
While we have been emphasising the continuities between the revisionary project and the more 
traditional approach, it is important to note the differences. Two are worth mentioning. First, 
anyone who wants to argue that knowledge is governed by a consistent sub-set of the principles 
                                                 
40 While applying the mechanics of evolutionary theory to concepts is a bit of stretch, one might 
expect our concepts, much like our bodies, to be well adapted to our environment. So why think 
our knowledge concept isn’t already ideally suited to serve the relevant functions? First, as we’ll 
argue in the next sub-section only a subset of the principles governing knowledge are ideally suited 
to serve the relevant functions. Whatever forces have shaped our knowledge concept, they have 
added unnecessary extras. Second, if we take the evolutionary analogy seriously, we should expect 
our concepts to have unnecessary extras. Consider the human appendix, which we still have but 
serves no obvious function. Our suggestion is that certain principles governing knowledge are, in 
this respect, like the appendix. 
  
needs an error-theoretic explanations. For instance, someone who wants to argue that knowledge 
is governed by (Parity of Evidence Principle) but not (Knowledge-Action Principle) needs an 
error-theoretic explanation why we mistakenly think knowledge is governed by (Knowledge-
Action Principle). But someone who is engaging in the revisionary project doesn’t need error-
theoretic explanations. She isn’t saying that knowledge is governed by some consistent sub-set of 
her principles. She is saying that knowledge should be governed by that consistent sub-set (or, 
equivalently, that knowledge* is).  
Second, the revisionary project fundamentally differs from more traditional approaches with 
respect to its aim. Put somewhat metaphorically, our approach is a sort of conceptual engineering.41 
In answering our question - what should knowledge be like? - we start by looking at what we 
expect knowledge to do for us and then ask what knowledge would have to be like in order to 
best do those things. Compare the engineer who wants to figure out what a bridge should do, in 
order to design a better bridge. She will start by looking at what good bridges are expected to do 
and how they do it. She can then ask what her bridge would have to be like in order to do those 
things better than existing bridges. In the process she might realise that her bridge should be 
slightly different from other bridges, because this would make it better suited to its purpose. 
Similarly, if our account of knowledge has to be revised in order for knowledge to best serve the 
relevant functions, we should make those changes. 
With the methodology in place, we turn to developing a revisionary account of knowledge*. 
3.2. Revisionary Sensitive Invariantism 
To recap: we will construct the concept knowledge* around our three functions. If this doesn’t 
determine a unique account of knowledge*, we’ll choose the account that preserves the greatest 
number of principles. Our first step will be to identify two consistent subsets of the various 
principles. Our second step will be to identify which of these subsets is supported by our 
functions. 
First, recall that (Social Principle) and (Knowledge-Action Principle) conflict with (Parity of 
Evidence Principle) and (Testimony Principle). This is not surprising. (Social Principle) relativises 
the rightness of ascribing knowledge to the social context, and (Knowledge-Action Principle) 
relativises knowledge itself to some combination of the practical environment and salience 
effects. In contrast, both (Parity of Evidence Principle) and (Testimony Principle) rely on the 
                                                 
41 We borrow this metaphor from Haslanger, ‘Gender and Race’. 
  
thought that the amount of evidence required for knowing and transmitting that knowledge 
remains stable and invariant through all contexts. As we’ll put it in what follows, the thought is 
that knowledge is stable - it doesn’t vary with non-evidential factors. Recall also that anything 
that goes for (Parity of Evidence Principle) goes for (Strength of Evidence Principle), because 
the former entails the latter. 
Second, recall that (Odds Principle), (Weak Knowledge Principle) and (Strength of Evidence 
Principle) are inconsistent. The problem with this set is that it looks like we can have knowledge 
about certain mundane matters on fairly weak evidence, yet not have knowledge about other 
matters on extremely strong evidence. I have far more evidence that I will lose the lottery based 
on knowing the odds than I have that Manchester United won 2-1 last night based on reading 
the paper, yet the latter looks like knowledge whereas the former doesn’t.  
Finally, recall that (Odds Principle), (Weak Knowledge Principle) and (Closure Principle) are 
inconsistent because, via (Closure Principle), my knowing some mundane matter (e.g. I can’t 
afford to go on safari) entails my knowing some non-mundane matter (e.g. I haven’t won the 
lottery).  
Two consistent subsets of principles are emerging. On the one hand, considerations supporting 
stability support (Parity of Evidence Principle), (Testimony Principle) and (Strength of Evidence 
Principle). This set of principles looks to be incompatible with (Knowledge-Action Principle) 
and (Social Principle), and one of (Weak Knowledge Principle), (Odds Principle) and (Closure 
Principle). We will call a view that preserves this subset of principles ‘revisionary insensitive 
invariantism’. We use this label because it is a revisionary version of a non-revisionary view often 
labelled ‘insensitive invariantism’, on which whether a subject S knows p just depends on the 
usual truth-conducive factors.42 The main difference between this view and revisionary 
insensitive invariantism is that the latter is a view about knowledge*, whereas the former is a 
view about knowledge. 
On the other hand, considerations supporting the partial relativisation of both the rightness of 
ascribing ‘knowledge’, and knowledge itself, to particular contexts support (Knowledge-Action 
Principle) and (Social Principle). This set of principles looks to be incompatible with (Parity of 
Evidence Principle), (Testimony Principle) and (Strength of Evidence Principle), and one of 
(Odds Principle), (Weak Knowledge Principle) and (Closure Principle). We will call a view that 
                                                 
42 See Brown, ‘Contextualism and Warranted Assertibility’; Gerken, ‘Warrant and Action’; Rysiew, 
‘Context-Sensitivity of Knowledge’. 
  
preserves this subset of principles ‘revisionary sensitive invariantism’. We use this label because it 
is a revisionary version of a view often labelled ‘sensitive invariantism’, on which whether S 
knows p depends on a combination of truth-conducive factors, practical factors and salience 
effects.43 Again, the main difference between this view and revisionary sensitive invariantism is 
that the latter is a view about knowledge*, whereas the former is a view about knowledge. 
This table compares the two views: 
 Revisionary insensitive invariantism Revisionary sensitive invariantism 
Accepts  (Parity of Evidence Principle)  
 (Testimony Principle) 
 (Strength of Evidence Principle) 
 Two of: (Closure Principle), (Weak 
Knowledge Principle) and (Odds 
Principle) 
 (Knowledge-Action Principle) 
 (Social Principle) 
 Two of: (Odds Principle), (Weak 
Knowledge Principle) and 
(Closure Principle) 
Denies  (Knowledge-Action Principle) 
 (Social Principle) 
 One of: (Closure Principle), (Weak 
Knowledge Principle), (Odds 
Principle) 
 (Parity of Evidence Principle) 
 (Testimony Principle)  
 (Strength of Evidence Principle). 
 One of: (Closure Principle), (Weak 
Knowledge Principle), (Odds 
Principle) 
Which revisionary view should be preferred? In what follows we argue that the functions of 
knowledge lead us towards revisionary sensitive invariantism, and away from revisionary 
insensitive invariantism. 
First, two of our functions support (Knowledge-Action Principle), which says that knowing p is 
necessary and sufficient for treating p as a reason for action. Here are two considerations in 
support of the sufficiency direction. First, if knowledge has the function of providing grounds 
for action, the best way for knowledge to serve this function would be if knowledge were 
sufficient for rational action. Second, inquiry often leads to action. When I inquire into when the 
next bus leaves from my stop, the conclusion of my inquiry will result in action (going to the bus 
stop at a certain time). If knowledge has the function of indicating when an inquirer can 
                                                 
43 See Fantl and McGrath, Knowledge in an Uncertain World; Hawthorne, Knowledge and Lotteries; 
Stanley, Knowledge and Practical Interests. 
  
reasonably terminate inquiry, then the best way for knowledge to serve this function would be by 
being sufficient for rational action. 
We also offer a consideration in support of the necessity direction. If knowledge were sufficient 
but not necessary for rational action then there would have to be some other epistemic position 
(or cluster of positions) with the function of providing grounds for action and terminating 
inquiry, at least in the cases in which knowledge is not required. But it is unclear what that 
position could be. Consider some candidates: believing, truly believing, justifiably believing, and 
truly justifiably believing. The problem is that one can (truly/justifiably/truly justifiably) believe p 
yet not be rational in acting on p or reasonable in terminating inquiry into whether p. I may 
(truly/justifiably/truly justifiably) believe my lottery ticket has lost, but that doesn’t mean I am 
rational in throwing it away, or reasonable in not checking the results. This suggests that 
something stronger is needed for rational action, and the obvious candidate is knowledge. 
We don’t deny that knowledge could serve both functions while being neither necessary nor 
sufficient for rational action.44 But our aim is to engineer an account of knowledge that is 
‘custom built’ to serve a number of functions. If we are designing knowledge to serve the 
function of providing grounds for action and signalling when inquiry can be reasonably 
terminated, the best way to do so is to have an account of knowledge on which it is both 
sufficient and necessary for rational action and terminating inquiry. Even if there are other ways 
of securing the desired function, it is far better to build our account of knowledge in such a way 
that the function is served than to hope that features of pragmatics can do the job.  
Second, the function of identifying good informants supports (Social Principle). In order to be a 
good informant a subject must be sensitive to the social context in which she is offering her 
information. Take a variant of the Jane case in §1.2. If Jane approaches Tom to ask which train 
to get then Tom should be sensitive to exactly how important it is that Jane get the right train. If 
it is imperative that Jane get on a particular train (because it’s the fast train), Tom should be very 
careful before saying he ‘knows’ which train it is. In contrast, if it matters little which train Jane 
gets, Tom can be a little less careful before saying he ‘knows’ which train it is. 
These two considerations support (Knowledge-Action Principle) and (Social Principle). 
Consequently, they support revisionary sensitive invariantism over revisionary insensitive 
invariantism, as the revisionary insensitive invariantist seems forced to reject both principles. So 
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revisionary sensitive invariantism gives us an account of knowledge* that satisfies the Function 
Constraint. By the lights of our revisionary methodology, it is the best account of knowledge* 
available. 
We finish this sub-section by considering two objections. First, the function of providing 
grounds for action supports (Weak Knowledge Principle). There are many circumstances in 
which we have to act on relatively weak evidence, and are clearly perfectly rational to do so. If 
knowledge has the function of providing grounds for action, then the fact that we are often 
rational in acting on relatively weak evidence suggests that we can often know on relatively weak 
evidence. But the revisionary sensitive invariantist has to reject one of (Weak Knowledge 
Principle), (Odds Principle) and (Closure Principle).  
Given her revisionary aspirations, the revisionary sensitive invariantist is entitled to reject (Odds 
Principle) or (Closure Principle). But this might make one worry about the soundness of the 
methodology. So it is important to note that she has another move available. Recall the puzzle: it 
seems one can know one can’t afford to go on safari, yet from (Closure Principle) it follows that 
one thereby knows one hasn’t won the lottery, which contradicts (Odds Principle). The 
revisionary sensitive invariantist says that whether a subject knows depends on certain non-truth 
conducive factors, such as which error-possibilities are salient to the subject. The intuitive idea is 
that, the more error-possibilities are salient, the harder it is to know. As Hawthorne has argued, it 
is plausible that going through the process of deducing that one hasn’t won the lottery changes 
what error-possibilities are salient in such a way that, at the end of the process, one no longer 
knows one can’t afford to go on safari.45 Consequently, one doesn’t know one hasn’t won the 
lottery, and (Odds Principle) and (Closure Principle) are both respected. Thus, the revisionary 
sensitive invariantist has the resources to deny that there is any sort of puzzle here. But she can 
only do so because she denies (Parity of Evidence Principle). 
Second, revisionary sensitive invariantism doesn’t sit well with (Testimony Principle). (Testimony 
Principle) says that, as long as certain conditions are met, one can gain knowledge just through 
being told. But knowledge can’t always be transmitted across different social or practical 
contexts. If it doesn’t matter much to Tom whether this is the fast train or not, whereas it does 
matter a lot to Jane, Jane can’t come to know that it is the fast train just by Tom telling her that 
this is the fast train.  
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Again, the revisionary sensitive invariantist is entitled to reject (Testimony Principle). But, again, 
this might make one wonder about the soundness of the methodology. However, while the 
revisionary sensitive invariantist can’t save (Testimony Principle), there is a simple modification 
of it that she can endorse: 
(Testimony Principle*) If S knows* p, then S* would be in a position to know* p if S were to tell her 
so (assuming S is generally trustworthy, the context of S* is not more demanding than that of S, and nothing 
else interferes with the transmission of knowledge*).46 
(Testimony Principle*) is fully compatible with (Knowledge-Action Principle) and (Social 
Principle) because it restricts (Testimony Principle) to all and only those contexts that don’t 
violate (Knowledge-Action Principle) and (Social Principle). 
Here are two worries about (Testimony Principle*). First, it doesn’t fit with how we use 
testimony. We don’t generally check the context of our audiences before issuing testimony, and 
we don’t generally check the context of the testifier before receiving it. Second, it threatens the 
spread of knowledge* through testimonial exchange. In all cases where the hearer is in a more 
demanding context than the testifier, testimony fails to transmit knowledge*.   
On the first worry, (Testimony Principle*) tells us when testimonial exchanges transmit 
knowledge*, not when speakers will testify. Testifiers don’t always know the context of their 
audience, and their audience doesn’t always know the context of the testifier, but they testify 
regardless. That they do so isn’t surprising. Figuring out the context of one’s audience before 
testifying will often be impractical, difficult and not worth the effort. Much the same goes for 
figuring out the context of a testifier before hearing their testimony. We suspect that much of the 
time we operate on the assumption that someone is in a standard sort of context unless we are 
given reason to think otherwise. In cases where the assumption is false, testimonial exchanges 
may fail to transmit knowledge*. 
On the second worry, (Testimony Principle*) doesn’t lead to scepticism. The principle tells us 
that testimony won’t transmit knowledge* in certain cases. Such cases include the variant of the 
Jane case where Tom, to whom it matters little whether this is the fast train, tells Jane, to whom 
it matters a lot, that this is the fast train. But, on the plausible assumption that the testifier often 
isn’t in a less demanding situation than her audience, many cases of testimony will transmit 
                                                 
46 Put very roughly, demandingness is a function of the social and practical environment, as well 
as the sorts of error-possibilities one is considering. 
  
knowledge*. Imagine neither Hannah nor Sarah particularly enjoy getting wet. Hannah asks 
Sarah if she knows* what the weather is like outside. Sarah says “It’s raining.” Hannah asks Sarah 
whether she knows* it’s raining, and Sarah says “I know* because I took the rubbish out a few 
minutes ago.” In this case (Testimony Principle*) says that Hannah thereby comes to know* that 
it’s raining. Perhaps testimonial knowledge* is harder to achieve than knowledge, but it isn’t 
impossible. So (Testimony Principle*) avoids any sort of scepticism. 
3.3. The Carnapian Argument  
We have presented the core of our case for revisionary sensitive invariantism. We finish by 
briefly mentioning a further benefit. This benefit is distinct from the benefits discussed above, 
but connects with what we take to be the best motivation for revisionary projects in general, viz. 
our ‘engineering’ approach to philosophical analysis.  
Our revisionary approach follows Carnap and Quine in treating fruitfulness as important. For 
Carnap, the fruitfulness of a concept is a matter of it being useful for the formulation of 
universal statements and/or laws.47 One problem with this is that most concepts are fruitful in 
this sense. For almost any concept, there is a range of putative necessary truths about that 
concept, and each necessary truth furnishes universal statements and/or laws. For example, if 
(Odds Principle) is true then the concept knowledge is fruitful in that it is true, universally, that 
one can’t know one’s lottery ticket has lost just based on knowing the odds. So, unlike Carnap, 
we think of the fruitfulness of a concept as a matter of whether it is useful for formulating 
universal statements and/or laws that are themselves fruitful.48 
Because it upholds (Knowledge-Action Principle), revisionary sensitive invariantism is also 
fruitful in this sense. If we adopt an account of knowledge on which (Knowledge-Action 
Principle) is true, we are able to model the rationality of action in terms of knowledge. One way 
of doing this would be within a knowledge-based decision theoretic framework.49 According to 
decision theory, an agent’s choice is rational when it delivers maximal expected utility. According 
to knowledge-based decision theory, the relevant information to be considered for calculating 
what choice delivers the best expected utility is provided by the total knowledge of the agent. In 
other words, knowledge-based decision theory requires something like (Knowledge-Action 
Principle). Because it endorses (Knowledge-Action Principle), revisionary sensitive invariantism 
                                                 
47 Carnap, Foundations of Probability, 5-7. 
48 This is a partial definition of fruitfulness for concepts, not of fruitfulness itself. 
49 See Hawthorne and Stanley, ‘Knowledge and Action’, 580; Weatherson, ‘Knowledge, Bets, and 
Interests’. 
  
fits nicely with knowledge-based decision theory, which in turn provides a more precise account 
of the intuition according to which knowledge, and only knowledge, provides grounds for action 
and premises for sound reasoning.  
In contrast, because revisionary insensitive invariantism rejects (Knowledge-Action Principle), it 
isn’t fruitful in this sense. If (Knowledge-Action Principle) is false, we can’t model rationality in 
terms of knowledge, as any connections are (a) contingent and (b) complicated (see Gerken 
forthcoming). The revisionary insensitive invariantist may complain that (Parity of Evidence 
Principle), whether fruitful or not, is a true principle governing knowledge. But this complaint is 
beside the point, given our revisionary aims in this paper. 50  
4. Conclusion 
Let us take stock. We started by motivating an epistemological project - what we called a 
‘revisionary project’ - that focuses on what knowledge should be, not what knowledge is. The 
motivations were twofold. First, philosophical analysis should improve our conceptual resources, 
not just describe them. Second, there is a prima facie case that our concept knowledge is 
inconsistent. While the case is only prima facie, it suffices to show that knowledge isn’t quite as it 
should be. We then outlined how to develop a revisionary account of knowledge. The basic 
thought was that we make a list of the things we expect knowledge to do for us, then figure out 
what knowledge would have to be like in order to do those things. Finally, we argued that the 
upshot is what we called ‘revisionary sensitive invariantism’.  
At the start of this paper we noted that epistemologists have said little about what knowledge 
should be like. While this is partly due to a general suspicion of revisionary projects, it is also due 
to the lack of an established methodology for figuring out what knowledge should be like. There 
are lots of ways in which knowledge could be improved, and it isn’t clear how to choose between 
                                                 
50 Some have objected that a knowledge-based account of rationality is incompatible with Bayesian 
decision theory, since the latter relies on the notion of partial belief rather than knowledge 
(Douven, ‘Knowledge and Practical Reasoning’; Schiffer, ‘Interest-Relative Invariantism’). Though 
knowledge-based decision theory prima facie conflicts with credence-based decision theoretic 
frameworks, the two can be reconciled (Weisberg, ‘Knowledge in Action’). Further, we follow 
Weatherson, ‘Knowledge, Bets, and Interests’, in thinking that, if a choice between the two 
decision theoretic frameworks has to be made, there are independent reasons to prefer a 
knowledge-based decision theory.  
  
them. We hope we have assuaged the general suspicion of revisionary projects, at least in 
epistemology, and made a start on putting a methodology in place.51 
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